(Loosely based on THE MUF CRISIS by Robert C. Noel, University of California, Santa Barbara)

This is a diplomatic exercise, not a war-game. Although this simulation deals with nuclear weapons, its focus is meant to be political, not military. The exercise is set in contemporary time and involves actual nations. The problems raised, therefore, are very realistic. This simulation creates a synthesis of actual events and extrapolations of events into the near future. The scenario is cast in South Asia – the region in which a recent series of nuclear tests were conducted and which offers interesting interactions for the simulation. The conflictual nature of relations between India and Pakistan constitutes fertile ground for simulating many of the international political effects of nuclear proliferation.

The principal country-teams in the exercise are: Brunei, France, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and the United States. Simulation Control (SIMCON) is the simulation moderator and plays the role of all other countries relevant to this simulation. Country-teams can communicate with non-represented countries and non-state actors, such as the Kurds, via SIMCON. Such communication, however, should be kept to a minimum.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was first signed in 1968 to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and the conversion of nuclear energy technology for military purposes in order to decrease the threat of nuclear war. The principal supporters of the NPT have always been the nuclear superpowers. Beyond limiting the spread of nuclear technology for military use, the nuclear superpowers seek to eradicate the testing of nuclear weapons via the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. For years, India has refused to sign the NPT, arguing along with other non-signatories such as Brazil and China that the NPT protects superpower dominance in nuclear weapons and does not address their concerns about regional security threats. They have continued to pursue their cause under the NPT's Article Six, focusing on the pursuit of arms control and disarmament by the nuclear powers. Recent developments concerning nuclear materials security in Russia and the former Soviet republics, as well as the stated position of the new U.S. Administration in favor of a ballistic missile defense program, have returned non-proliferation to the international agenda, elevating the claims of non-signatories about 'nuclear hypocrisy' in the process.

It is not a secret in any part of the globe that several countries around the world have maintained covert nuclear weapons programs for many years without actually testing a nuclear device. These countries have most prominently included Pakistan (until recently), Israel, South Africa, North Korea and several others. There is, however, one new development that occurred in the spring of 1998. India detonated five nuclear weapons near its border with Pakistan. India was already a nuclear weapons state after its detonation of a "peaceful nuclear device" in the early 1970s. In response to India’s threat, Pakistan tested six of its own nuclear weapons. This show of power is an outcome of continued political-military conflict between the two states, particularly centering on Kashmir, a predominantly Muslim northern state in India.

Although both countries pledged in early June 1998 to undertake a testing moratorium, the events have unleashed a level of instability not seen in the region since the early 1970s. As a recent joint communique issued by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Canada, Italy, and Russia states: "The recent nuclear tests have created an atmosphere of regional instability which will undermine the region's attractiveness to both foreign and domestic investment, damaging business confidence and the prospect for economic growth." Adding to this uncertain dynamic in the region are several newly independent, predominantly Muslim, and relatively unstable Central Asian Republics such as Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

These events have precipitated a global crisis. The recent testing of nuclear power threatens the entire international community as future threats of nuclear testing and proliferation are imminent. The initial state of affairs is set according to current world events—the same leaders are in power, and the same issues remain on the international agenda. Given the recent developments in South Asia, there is increasing pressure in Central Asia and the Middle East to gain nuclear technology via nuclear development programs (a costly, long-term plan) or through the black market (a method with more immediate results). With an increasing demand for nuclear weapons, world leaders see threats to the security of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and from neighboring countries that might quickly become nuclear.

Indeed, an article appearing in an authoritative Western newspaper reported that Western intelligence sources strongly suspect that several atomic bombs have found their way into the clandestine arms market. The bombs are believed to be uranium weapons with an explosive force approximately equivalent to the weapon dropped on Hiroshima. The article reported that the source of the weapons is not known. This means that the recent fears over the security of existing nuclear weapons may well be justified. According to intelligence sources, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan among others have shown special interest in the purchase of the weapons. At a reported price of fifty million US dollars ($50,000,000), it is believed that a number of non-state actors, for example Hamas or the Kurds, might also be interested in the weapons.

If indeed nuclear weapons are readily available via the black market, then all governments represented in this exercise must defend themselves against accusations of attempting to buy nuclear weapons on the black market, or conversely, of supplying nuclear weapons to the black market. In this sense, the situation is rich with political and diplomatic implications. Participants are urged to carefully consider this development in order to avoid acting impulsively.

You should think about your information requirements. Each country-team should work from common knowledge about the participating countries. Additional information may be available from your respective bureaucracies, which will be simulated by SIMCON (i.e., the need for direct intelligence inquiries should be sent to SIMCON). After you have completed your information search, you should tailor a set of policy objectives for the hypothesized situation. Only then should you consider specific diplomatic moves to achieve these objectives.

TASKS: There are two central tasks in this simulation.